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This paper examines the relationship between hosting mega-events such as the Super
Bowl, Olympics, and World Cup and rental housing prices in host cities. If mega-events are
amenities for local residents, then rental housing prices can serve as a proxy for estimating
residents’ willingness to pay for these amenities. An analysis of rental prices in a panel of
American cities from 1993-2005 fails to find a consistent impact of mega-events on rental prices.
When controls are placed on the regression models to account for nationwide annual fluctuations
in rental prices, mega-events generally exhibit little impact on rental prices in cities as a whole
and are as likely to reduce rental prices as increase them. Somewhat stronger evidence exists,
however, that mega-events affect rental prices outside of the center city in a fundamentally
different manner than in the city core.
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Large sporting events such as the Olympics, World Cup, and league 
championships like the Super Bowl are highly sought after by cities, states, and countries. 
Indeed the competition among governments to host these “mega-events” can be as 
vigorous as the competition on the playing fields themselves. These premier events, 
however, often carry very high price tags. The governing bodies of sports such as the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA), or the National Football League (NFL) insist on state-of-the-art 
playing facilities and first-class accommodations for athletes, officials, and spectators.  
For example, in order to host the 2002 FIFA World Cup, South Korea built ten 
new stadiums at a cost of nearly $2 billion, and Japan constructed seven new stadiums 
and refurbished three others at a cost of at least $4 billion. The total investment for new 
infrastructure in Japan for the event was estimated by some analysts at more than 750 
billion yen ($5.6 billion) (Baade and Matheson, 2004). In the United States, the NFL 
typically awards the Super Bowl to cities that have recently completed stadium 
construction or major refurbishments. For example, seven of the last ten Super Bowls 
have been held in stadiums less than 10 years old, and the 2011 and 2012 Super Bowls 
have been awarded to Dallas-Fort Worth and Indianapolis, respectively, due to new 
stadiums either recently opening or soon due to debut in these cities. Of course, the best 
example of massive spending on a mega-event comes from Beijing. The Chinese 
government reportedly spent in excess of $40 billion in conjunction with the 2008 
Summer Olympics (Berlin, 2008; Baker 2008). 
  3In addition, as these events attract worldwide attention, they also become targets 
for terrorist activities, as witnessed at the Summer Olympics in Munich in 1972 and in 
Atlanta in 1996, and therefore security requirements are also very high. Greece reportedly 
spent $1.5 billion on security alone for the 2004 Summer Olympics (Meeks, 2004), and 
security restrictions in Beijing in 2008 “appear to have virtually eliminated any boost in 
tourism from the Olympics.” (Baker, 2008)  Thus, cities incur not only large capital 
expenses in conjunction with hosting large sporting events, but the operating costs can 
also be astronomical.
Local, state, and national governments typically justify their spending on sporting 
events on three grounds. First, they contend that these events attract athletes, spectators, 
officials, and media which increases revenue for accommodations, restaurants, and retail 
establishments. For example, the NFL estimates that the average economic impact of the 
Super Bowl on the host city is $300 to $400 million (Arizona Super Bowl Host 
Committee, 2008). Multi-day events such as the Summer or Winter Olympics or the 
World Cup can generate economic impact estimates well into the billions of dollars.  
Second, the sports boosters suggest that sporting events serve to publicize host 
cities to prospective tourists and future visitors. In justifying the $7.7 million budgeted to 
sports tourism, the Hawaii Tourism Authority states, “The positive media and publicity 
generated from national and international TV/ media coverage promotes Hawaii as a 
desirable sports venue and an attractive visitor destination.” (Hawaii Tourism Authority, 
2007, pg. 22) 
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them opportunities to watch major sporting events. The excitement surrounding these 
major events may make certain cities particularly desirable places to live or work. 
Sports economists have frequently dealt with similar claims of economic benefits 
from sports. The question of whether sporting events directly lead to increases in 
economic activity has been the most widely explored in the literature. As opposed to 
economic impact studies commissioned by the sports teams or leagues, independent 
economists examining an area’s economy before, during, and after major sporting events 
tend to find little or no economic impact from hosting major events. 
In general, while league-sponsored estimates may do a credible job in determining 
the economic activity that occurs as a result of a mega-event, they usually do a poor job 
of accounting for economic activity that is displaced by these games and often apply 
incorrect multipliers. For these reasons, numerous studies have looked back at the actual 
performance of economies that have hosted mega-events and have compared the 
observed economic performance of host cities to that predicted in ex ante studies.  Ex 
post analyses such as Porter (1999), Baade and Matheson (2001; 2004; 2006), Coates and 
Humphreys (2002), Coates (2006), Coates and Depken (2006), Hagn and Maennig 
(2007a; 2007b), Jasmand and Maennig (2007), and Baade, Baumann, and Matheson 
(2008), similarly uncover little relationship between hosting major sporting events and 
real economic variables such as employment, personal income, personal income per 
capita, and taxable sales. 
Sports backers also suggest that sporting events serve to publicize host cities to 
prospective tourists. As noted by Matheson (2008), “Sports fans may enjoy their visit to 
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is claimed, may relocate manufacturing facilities and company headquarters to the city. 
Television viewers might decide to take a trip to the host city at some time in the future 
based on what they see during the broadcast of the mega-event. Finally, hosting a major 
event might raise perceptions of the city so that it becomes a “major league” or “world 
class” city and travel destination. All of these claims are potentially true although little 
empirical research has conclusively demonstrated any long-run connections between 
hosting mega-events and future tourism demand, and there are not even any anecdotal 
examples of companies moving corporate operations to a city based on the hosting of a 
sporting event.” 
Empirically, the 1988 Winter Olympics did increase the worldwide name 
recognition of Calgary, but the effect was short-lived (Ritchie and Smith,1991). 
Similarly, the aftermath of the 1994 Winter Olympic Games did not bring a sustained 
boost in tourism to Lillehammer, but instead, 40% of the full-service hotels in the town 
soon went bankrupt (Tieglund, 1999).
  Furthermore, while mega-events clearly shine the limelight on host cities, not all 
the publicity generated is necessarily positive. For example, the riots following Detroit’s 
National Basketball Association championships in the early 1990s did little to improve 
the city’s status, and the bribery scandal that surrounded award of the 2002 Winter 
Olympics to Salt Lake City similarly tarnished that city’s reputation. Likewise, the 
international images of Munich and Atlanta were marred by the terrorist events that 
occurred during their respective Summer Olympic Games.  
  6Finally, the sports boosters note that these events improve the quality of life of 
local residents by allowing them opportunities to watch major sporting events, and it is 
this claim that will be the focus of this paper. Again, it is clear that sports do bring some 
intangible benefits to local residents. As Rudy Perpich, the former governor of 
Minnesota, once quipped, “Without professional sports, Minneapolis would just be a cold 
Omaha.” (Baumann, Matheson, and Muroi, 2009) Of course, measuring these benefits is 
a difficult task, and academic studies do not come to a uniform conclusion on the subject. 
Contingent valuation studies of professional sports franchises (Johnson, 
Groothius, and Whitehead, 2001; Johnson, Mondello, and Whitehead; 2006), stadiums 
and arenas (Groothius, Johnson, and Whitehead, 2004), and mega-events (Atkinson, et 
al., 2008; Walton, Longo, and Dawson, 2008) identify a willingness to pay for sports 
teams and events that is not simply captured in ticket sales. These identified intangible 
benefits, however, are generally smaller than the taxpayer contributions to stadium 
construction or event subsidization. Maennig (2007) analyzes the 2006 World Cup in 
Germany and similarly concludes that claims of “increased turnover in the retail trade, 
overnight accommodation, receipts from tourism and effects on employment [are] mostly 
of little value and may even be incorrect. Of more significance, however, are other 
(measurable) effects such as the novelty effect of the stadiums, the improved image for 
Germany and the feel good effect for the population.” (Maennig, 2007, p. 1) 
Tu (2005) estimated the impact of FedEx Field in Maryland, just outside of 
Washington, DC, on the property values around that venue using actual sale prices before 
and after construction in a differences-in-differences analysis. Ahlfeldt and Maennig 
(2007) evaluate the impact of three venues in Berlin on property values using a hedonic 
  7price model.  Feng and Humphreys (2008) use spatial econometrics to assess the effects 
of venues in Columbus, Ohio on property values in that city.  The common link among 
these papers is that they focus on properties in a single community and proximity to 
specific sports facilities.  In each of them, there is evidence that properties closer to the 
sports venues are priced differently than otherwise identical venues farther from the 
stadium or arena.  These studies, therefore, estimate the extent of local externalities or 
spillovers from sports facilities in the same way that one might consider the spillovers 
from proximity to a noxious facility, like a prison or hazardous waste treatment facility 
(Boyle and Kiel, 2001).  Moreover, the conclusions are quite consistent with the 
argument against stadium and arena subsidies that stadiums do not generate large area-
wide benefits but rather induce concentrated benefits in a small area close to the venue. 
Carlino and Coulson (2004) employ a different tactic in determining that NFL 
franchises have a positive impact on host cities. In particular, their goal is to assess the 
benefits of the presence of a sports franchise in the metropolitan area, benefits that are 
supposed to reach all neighborhoods in the area, regardless of distance to the home field 
of the team.  They find that housing rental prices are higher in cities with NFL teams and 
hypothesize that residents are willing to pay higher rents for the opportunity to live in a 
city with an amenity like an NFL franchise. Of course, cities with professional teams are 
generally larger metropolitan areas, which offer many other cultural attractions for which 
renters would also be willing to pay a premium. Indeed, Coates, Humphreys and 
Zimbalist (2006) find that Carlino and Coulson’s results are highly dependent on model 
specification; however, other studies have confirmed a relationship between housing 
prices and sporting venues. Coates and Gearhart (2008) used the same approach as 
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hosting NASCAR races.  They likened the one-off nature of a major event like the 
Daytona 500 to a mega-event, like hosting the Super Bowl or a World Cup. 
This paper examines whether hosting mega-events has a discernable effect on 
housing rental prices in host cities. In this paper we focus on three unquestioned mega-
events, the Super Bowl, the Olympics, and the World Cup.  The Super Bowl is, of course, 
played every year with the location varying from year to year.  Between 1993, when our 
data begins, and 2005, the last year of our data, both the Olympics and the World Cup 
have been held in the United States.  The World Cup round robin games were played at 
several sites around the country, and the Summer and Winter Olympics were hosted by 
Atlanta and Salt Lake City, respectively.   
The results of our analysis indicate that rental values are generally affected by 
hosting these mega-events.  We estimate our model on three different subsamples, and in 
each case we reject the null hypothesis that the mega-event variables all have a 
coefficient of zero.  However, the results also indicate that the primary action, in terms of 
individually statistically significant effects, is in hosting the Olympics and, especially, the 
World Cup.  
 
Model Presentation 
We estimate a hedonic model of the rental price of housing.  Among the attributes 
of the rental units that are priced in our model are characteristics of the unit, such as its 
age or the number of bedrooms, and characteristics of its immediate surroundings, like 
heavy traffic or garbage in the neighborhood streets.  The coefficient on each 
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equilibrium price, of one unit of that characteristic.  A significant coefficient means the 
presence of the associated characteristic shifts the demand or the supply for housing, 
either increasing or decreasing the equilibrium price of a rental. 
In our analysis, the characteristic whose value is of interest, in our case whether or 
not a city hosts the Super Bowl, Olympic Games, or World Cup soccer matches in a 
given year, will have equal impact on rents everywhere in the community.  Carlino and 
Coulson (2004) followed this approach to assess the social benefits to a community of 
hosting a professional football franchise.  Coates and Gearhart (2008) used this method to 
determine if hosting NASCAR events affected rents. 
We examine the rent data for evidence that hosting any of these mega-events 
translates into changes in the rental rate.  If people receive non-pecuniary benefits from 
hosting an event, they may express it indirectly through an increased demand for housing 
in the area.  This increased demand bids up the price of housing, which consequently 
increases rental values.  One possible non-pecuniary benefit received from hosting the 
Super Bowl, for example, is the enhanced sense of community pride attributable to the 
national and world-wide exposure of the city that comes with the Super Bowl.  This 
effect is the same for all of the people living in the area, regardless of their proximity to 
the stadium where the game takes place, and is what this paper attempts to measure. 
This paper will follow Carlino and Coulson (2004) and Coates and Gearhart 
(2008), using essentially the same housing data, and many of the same control variables.  
However, unlike Carlino and Coulson, this paper addresses the impact of specific events.  
Of course, they could not evaluate the effect of individual NFL games on rents because 
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NFL teams only infrequently leave cities or enter new markets. This makes it difficult to 
determine whether the high rental rates commonly found in NFL cities are a result of the 
franchise itself or other attributes of the area. By contrast, only one Super Bowl is played 
annually, and its location changes from year to year. The Olympics and World Cup, 
while encompassing several days of events, are also only in town once.  Moreover, many 
cities host NFL teams that did not and never will host the Super Bowl, Olympics, or 
World Cup.  We estimate the hedonic rent model on three sets of data: 1) the full sample 
of SMSAs used in Coates and Gearhart (2008), 2) all cities that were home to an NFL, 
NBA (basketball), MLB (baseball), or NHL (hockey) franchise at some time during our 
time frame for which the rental data exist and 3) the subset of cities that actually hosted a 
Super Bowl.  
The dependent variable in the models will be the natural log of real rent, with 
1993 as the base year.  Nominal rents are converted to real rents using the CPI inflation 
calculator available at the Bureau of Labor Statistics website (http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/cpicalc.pl). The model is estimated with SMSA-specific fixed effects.  Also, 
interactions between the time variable and the SMSA dummy variables are included to 
allow for SMSA specific time trends. The general model is as follows: 
 
lndrentijt = αAjt + βHijt + ∑δjSMSAjt + ∑γj(SMSA*time)jt + ∑λyyearyt+ εijt, 
 
where Ajt is the Super Bowl or other mega-event host variable (or variables), Hijt are 
housing unit characteristics, α is the parameter (or parameters) of interest measuring the 
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vector of parameters to be estimated which reflect the implicit rental prices of the housing 
characteristics. The δj and γj are city j specific intercepts and time trends to be estimated, 
λy are year specific effects, and ε is a random error with mean zero but whose variance 
differs by SMSA and year.  All of the model errors are clustered by SMSA-year, 
allowing the errors in rents within an SMSA in a year to be correlated with one another 
but not correlated with errors from other SMSAs or other years. If the variance of the 
regression error is assumed to be the same either among all SMSAs or among all years, 
and it is in fact, dissimilar, the standard errors of the regressions will be incorrect, and 
hypothesis tests will be unreliable.  Clustering by both SMSA and year will allow the 
error variance to differ by both SMSA and year.  In addition, inverse probability (of 
selection) weights are placed on the observations to make the sample data more 
representative of the population. 
The null hypothesis is that the mega-event variables have no impact on residential 
rental values. That is, the coefficients in the vector α are all equal to zero. The alternative 
hypothesis is that at least one of the coefficients is different from zero.  We will reject the 
null if the estimate of the impact of some mega-event is either improbably large or 
improbably small under the null hypothesis.  We will also discuss the individual 
coefficients and, especially, the importance of a rental unit being within or outside of the 
central city of the SMSA. 
 
The Data 
  12The housing unit data used (both rental values and unit-specific characteristics) 
comes from the American Housing Survey AHS (national data, as opposed to metro).  
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.  The duration spans 13 years, from 1993 to 
2005, inclusive.  The regressions are estimated on three samples.  The largest of the 
samples includes observations on 141 SMSAs (a complete listing is in the Appendix).  
The other two samples restrict attention to those SMSAs that are home to NFL, Major 
League Baseball, National Basketball Association, or National Hockey League 
franchises, which we call “big league cities”, and those that hosted a Super Bowl between 
1993 and 2005.  In each sample, a little over 60% of the observations come from the 
central city of the SMSA as defined by the AHS. 
The mean of the natural log of real rent is 6.1 to 6.2 in each of the samples.  In 
dollars, the average monthly rents are 546 for the full sample, 565 for the big league 
cities sample, and 572 for the Super Bowl host cities. The average unit has 1.15 full 
bathrooms, 0.13 half baths, and 1.75 bedrooms.  About 38% of the units in the full 
sample have central air conditioning, while 36% of the big league cities’ units do and 
44% of the Super Bowl host city units do.  That split is not surprising since Super Bowl 
host cities tend to be warm weather locations, like Miami, New Orleans, and Los 
Angeles.  Almost all are attached to the public sewer system; the vast majority (75% in 
the full sample, 78% in the big league city sample, and over 90% in the Super Bowl host 
sample) are low rise units (less than three stories), and very few (less than about 2%) 
have holes in the floor.  Nearly half the rental units from Super Bowl host cities have 
garages, but only 30% of either the full or big league sample does.  
  13  In the data, ten cities were 1994 World Cup venues.  These cities were Boston, 
Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Fort Worth, Los Angeles, New York, Orlando, San Jose, and 
Washington.  Only two, Atlanta and Salt Lake City, held the Olympics; the 1996 Summer 
Games in Atlanta and the 2002 Winter Games in Salt Lake.  The AHS national sample 
data is only collected in odd numbered years.  Consequently, the best we can do is 
identify the World Cup and Olympic host observations in the year before and the year 
after the events.  For some of the Super Bowl host cities that is also the best we can do.  
Moreover, if a city hosts the Super Bowl in an odd numbered year, we cannot identify 
observations for that city in the year prior to or the year after the game.  Ten cities hosted 
the Super Bowl during the period from 1993 through 2005.  The host cities are: Atlanta 
(1994, 2000), Houston (2004), Miami (1995, 1999), New Orleans (1997, 2002), 
Jacksonville (2005), San Diego (1998, 2003), Phoenix (1996), Tampa (2001), and Los 
Angeles (1993).  Additionally, Minneapolis hosted the 1992 Super Bowl so observations 
from that city are identified in the 1993 data for the year after hosting the game.  Detroit 
hosted the 2006 Super Bowl, so observations from that city in 2005 are associated with 
the year prior to hosting the game.  
  Clearly, the timing of the AHS and the events is not ideal.  We would prefer to 
have data from a given city in the year before, the year of and the year following hosting 
an event.  Such data would allow us to be more confident that we had captured any 
effects of the event on rents.  For example, in the year prior to the event, rents may be bid 
up in anticipation of the tight housing market to come or as people attempt to acquire 
rental units that they can sublet during the event.  In the year after the event, the market 
may contract, or the desirable attributes of hosting the event may make the city an 
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Unfortunately, we cannot follow the rental market in a given SMSA from before the 
event.  Our analysis identifies the cities it can in the year prior and the year subsequent to 
the event, but misses those cities in the year of the event.  Other cities are identified in the 
year of the event, but we miss those cities in the years before and after.  Consequently, 
our inferences are conditional on the assumption that the results for the two types of cities 
can be combined to piece together the story for any city from beginning to end. 
 
Results 
  This section presents our findings from alternative samples of cities and from 
different specifications of the model.  All models contain the same set of rental unit 
characteristics, city specific effects appropriate to the sample, and city specific time 
trends.   
  Table 2 reports the coefficient estimates from regressions on the full sample of 
SMSAs in our data.  We focus only on the event coefficients in this table, reporting 
coefficients for the rental unit characteristics variables in Table A2 in the appendix.  Each 
model in the table also includes city specific intercepts and city specific time trends.  The 
first column, Model 1, contains results from the basic model, without interaction terms 
between the event variables and the central city dummy variable and without year 
specific effects.  Model 2 adds central city interaction terms with each of the event 
variables; Model 3 extends Model 1 by introducing year dummies to the analysis, and 
Model 4 includes year dummies and the central city-event interactions.  All models are 
estimated with clustering error terms by city and year.   
  15First consider the uninteracted event variables, the first nine rows of the column, 
across the four models.  None of the Super Bowl variables is remotely statistically 
significant, indicating that a) there is no market anticipation of the benefits of the Super 
Bowl in the year prior to the event, b) there is no evidence of the rental market being 
tighter in the year of the Super Bowl, and c) after the Super Bowl there is no residual 
impact on the rental market.  If hosting the Super Bowl affects the rental housing market 
in an SMSA, it is not apparent in these regressions.  By contrast, the Olympic and World 
Cup variables are frequently individually significant. 
  For example, there are effects on the rental housing market in the year before and 
the year after hosting the Summer Olympics, the year prior to hosting the Winter 
Olympics, and both before and after hosting the World Cup.  In Model 1, our results 
indicate that in the years before and after hosting the Summer Olympics, Atlanta saw its 
rents lower by 8% to 11%.  The significance of these results is sensitive to the inclusion 
of year and central city interactions, however.  Consistent with the results in Coates and 
Gearhart (2008) for NASCAR races, the central city and non-central city are affected 
differently by the Summer Olympics.  Looking at the results in Model 4, the non-central 
city housing units around Atlanta are not affected by the run up to the Summer Olympics 
and see an increase in rents after the games, while rental units in the city of Atlanta have 
lower rents both before and after hosting the games.  Note that these effects are net of any 
general Atlanta effect and any Atlanta specific trend, as there are both a city specific 
intercept and city specific time trend in the model.  Nonetheless, it may be that these 
results are specific to Atlanta rather than related to the Summer Olympics, as Atlanta is 
the only host of Summer Olympic Games in our data.  
  16  The effect of hosting the Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City contrasts 
completely with the Atlanta results.  Without central city interactions, neither the year 
before nor the year after the games is statistically different than other observations in our 
data.  However, once the interaction terms are included, the evidence is that central city 
Salt Lake housing units have higher rents both before and after hosting the games, and 
rents outside Salt Lake City but still in the Salt Lake SMSA are lower than elsewhere 
prior to the games but no different afterwards. 
The difference between the Atlanta and the Salt Lake City results is perhaps 
puzzling.  Both cities built housing for the Olympic athletes which then was placed in the 
rental market once the Games were over.   For example, in Salt Lake City, housing in the 
Olympic Village has been opened to 3,500 students. The New Georgia Encyclopedia says 
that in Atlanta, a public housing project (Techwood Homes) was replaced by a 
combination of apartments and dormitories.  An increase in the supply of rental units 
would, all other things constant, result in lower rents after the Games.  Our findings for 
Salt Lake City are clearly not consistent with this, suggesting that all other things were 
not constant.  In Atlanta, the Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions argues, in Atlanta’s 
Olympic Legacy: Background Paper (2007), that the Olympics served as a catalyst for 
gentrification of downtown Atlanta at the cost of losses of hundreds of rental units for 
low and moderate income individuals and families.  Given the destruction of such a large 
number of units, we would expect rents to rise.  However, many of these units were in 
public housing and it may be that individuals displaced from these units were too poor to 
effectively bid up rents on the existing or newly developed units.  Alternatively, and 
consistent with our results, perhaps these displaced city dwellers moved out of the city 
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rents down, while the exodus to the suburbs would tend to bid up rents there.  Moreover, 
if the gentrification produced an increase in the number of rental units for middle and 
upper middle class families that would cause the price of such units to come down. 
  Hosting of World Cup games may have had positive effects on the rental rates, 
though that finding is sensitive to the inclusion of the year specific dummy variables.  In 
Models 1 and 2, both the year before the event and the year after the event, rents were 
higher in the host cities between 7% and 14%.  Each of these effects is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  Recall that the model includes city specific intercepts and 
time trends, so these effects on rents in the pre and post World Cup years are not simply 
due to omitting some characteristic common to the host cities. Of course, unlike the 
Super Bowl which is an annual event, the U.S. has only hosted the World Cup once, in 
1994; therefore, the positive coefficients on the World Cup variables may simply be 
capturing strong housing markets nationwide. That these effects disappear once the year 
dummies are included supports the supposition that the World Cup results are year and 
not event driven.  
  The first panel of Table 5 summarizes the results of joint hypothesis tests on the 
full sample.  The null hypotheses are that 1) all sports events variables have a zero 
coefficient (All Events), 2) all Super Bowl variables have a zero coefficient (Super Bowl 
only), 3) all Olympic variables have a zero coefficient (Olympics only), 4) all World Cup 
variables have a zero coefficient (World Cup only), and 5) all central city interaction 
terms have a zero coefficient (Interactions only).  For the full sample, there are 18 
different joint hypothesis tests reported, and in only six of them can the null not be 
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coefficients.  However, four of the six cases in which the null of no effect cannot be 
rejected are the Super Bowl only hypotheses.  Put differently, every case in which the 
Super Bowl is the sole focus of the hypothesis, the evidence is that hosting the game is 
unrelated to rents in the SMSA.  In each instance where the focus is on the Olympics, the 
tests reject the null of no impact.  Likewise, the evidence is consistent that central city 
rents and non-central city rents are affected differently by hosting the events.  The 
evidence also indicates that hosting the World Cup has no impact once the year dummies 
are included, but have an impact when they are not. 
  One possible objection to our results is that they are driven by the inclusion of 
large numbers of observations from small and moderately sized SMSAs, especially those 
that play host to none of the sporting events.  We restrict the sample in two ways to 
assess this possibility.  First, we focus on “big league” cities, those that were home to a 
franchise in one of the big four professional sport at any time during our sample.  These 
results are reported in Table 3.  Second, we focus only on those cities that actually hosted 
the Super Bowl between 1992 and 2006 (omitting Detroit whose inclusion has no little 
impact on the results) to evaluate the impact on rents of doing so, and report the results in 
Table 4.   
The big league cities sample produces results that are nearly identical to those 
from the full sample as a comparison of Tables 2 and 3 will attest.  Each column in Table 
3 corresponds to the same column in Table 2, including all the same regressors, The 
difference is that the big league cities sample of Table 3 utilizes about 17,000  fewer 
observations than the full sample.  The lost observations come from SMSAs that hosted 
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big league cities sample, the results of which match perfectly with those of the full 
sample.  Given the tight similarity between the full and big league cities samples, we 
discuss the latter no more, turning instead to the sample of Super Bowl host cities. 
Restricting attention to Super Bowl host cities muddies the waters a bit on 
whether hosting the Super Bowl affects rents.  Whereas the broader samples indicated no 
such impact, the more restrictive sample suggests that the central city areas may have 
lower rents in the year before and the year of the game, while the outlying areas may see 
a boost to rents in the year of the game.    It is possible, however, that such findings are 
an artifact of omitted year specific effects as once those are included both the size and 
level of significance of the event variables decline.  Nonetheless, in Model 12 which 
includes year dummies and central city interactions, the coefficients on the year of the 
game and the central city interaction with the year of the game are individually 
significant, at the 10 and 5% levels respectively.  These coefficients indicate that rental 
units within the central city have about 4% lower rents the year the game is in town, 
while non-central city units have 11% higher rents that year. 
The bottom panel of Table 5 summarizes the results of joint hypothesis tests from 
the Super Bowl host cities sample.  The null of no effect is clearly rejected at 
conventional significance levels for units within the central city (evidenced  by the row 
for “All events” and “Interactions only”).  Combining the central city and non-central city 
observations or focusing on the non-central city observations alone, the evidence is less 
supportive of an impact from hosting the Super Bowl.   
  20Summing up the Super Bowl case, the best that can be said is that hosting the 
Super Bowl has no effect, while the worst that can be said is that the Super Bowl raises 
rents in the suburbs but lowers them in the central city.  One interpretation of these 
results is that the Super Bowl induces renters to move out of downtown, bidding up rents 
in the suburbs and bidding down rents in the city center.  An alternative interpretation is 
if there are advertising or name recognition benefits that make an area more desirable 
after the Super Bowl, those benefits accrue to the suburbs but not to the central city area 
of the metropolis.  Such an interpretation means that a city that wins a bid to host a Super 
Bowl may be providing a public service to its suburbs in a reverse Robin Hood sort of 
fashion. 
Olympic host results are mixed.  The problem is that only two cities hosted 
Olympics, so it is difficult to separate the hosting effects from the specific cities in 
specific years effects.  The World Cup variables are less of a problem because there are 
more cities that hosted games.  However, all of these games occurred in the same year.  
This means that it is not possible to distinguish between effects of hosting World Cup 
games and yearly rent shocks that are similar across several big cities.   
The strongest result evident in Table 5 concerns the central city interaction terms.  
In each model which includes them, one must reject the null hypothesis that all the 
interaction terms carry a zero coefficient.  This means that regardless of the event or 
events, and regardless of the sample of SMSAs from which observations are drawn, 
hosting the events has a different impact on rents in the suburbs than on rents in the 
central city. 
 
  21Conclusions  
This paper examines the relationship between hosting mega-events such as the 
Super Bowl, Olympics, and World Cup and rental housing prices in host cities. If mega-
events are amenities for local residents, then rental housing prices can serve as a proxy 
for estimating residents’ willingness to pay for these amenities. An analysis of rental 
prices in a panel of American cities from 1993-2005 fails to find a consistent impact of 
mega-events on rental prices. When controls are placed on the regression models to 
account for nationwide annual fluctuations in rental prices, mega-events generally exhibit 
little impact on rental prices in cities as a whole and are as likely to reduce rental prices 
as increase them. Somewhat stronger evidence exists, however, that mega-events affect 
rental prices outside of the center city in a fundamentally different manner than in the city 
core. 
If this analysis had uncovered a consistent pattern of higher rental prices 
associated with mega-events, such evidence would provide a strong justification for 
subsidizing this type of event. Higher rental prices may capture a willingness to pay to 
live in a city that provides these types of entertainment for its citizens that is perhaps not 
captured by more direct explorations of the economic impact of mega-events. However, 
the various model specifications show that rental prices are as likely to fall as they are to 
raise during mega-events suggesting that renters do not display a preference for living in 
cities hosting the Super Bowl, Olympics, or World Cup, and may, in fact, display a 
preference to not live in cities disrupted by these events. Furthermore, in the case of the 
Super Bowl and Summer Olympics, renters show an increased desire to live outside the 
center city at the expense of rental rates in the central area although the reverse appears to 
  22be true for the Winter Olympics. Taken as a whole, an analysis of housing rental prices 
does not support the conclusion that local residents place a large value on the honor of 
hosting these events.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics           
  Full Sample  Big League Cities  Super Bowl Hosts 
Variable  Mean  Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Log of real rent  6.134 0.736 6.169 0.734 6.222  0.623
Host Super Bowl  0.021 0.144 0.028 0.166 0.090  0.287
Hosted SB last year  0.015 0.122 0.020 0.141 0.065  0.247
Host SB next year  0.016 0.126 0.022 0.146 0.057  0.232
Host Summer Olympics 
next year  0.002 0.047 0.003 0.055 0.001  0.097
Hosted Summer Olympics 
last year  0.002 0.042 0.002 0.049 0.001  0.088
Host Winter Olympics next 
year 0.001 0.025 0.001 0.029 Na 
Hosted Winter Olympics 
last year  0.001 0.027 0.001 0.031 Na 
Host World Cup next year  0.046 0.209 0.060 0.237 0.044  0.205
Hosted World Cup last year  0.072 0.258 0.095 0.293 0.106  0.308
Central Air Conditioning  0.381 0.486 0.358 0.479 0.432  0.495
Bathrooms 1.148 0.430 1.144 0.426 1.218  0.475
Bedrooms 1.787 0.900 1.760 0.897 1.726  0.867
Detached unit  0.145 0.352 0.129 0.335 0.180  0.385
Garage 0.304 0.460 0.313 0.464 0.478  0.500
Half bathrooms  0.126 0.363 0.126 0.360 0.132  0.356
Holes in the floor  0.020 0.139 0.021 0.143 0.017  0.129
Highrise 0.063 0.244 0.077 0.266 0.021  0.142
Lowrise 0.789 0.408 0.756 0.429 0.910  0.286
Public sewer  0.986 0.118 0.990 0.101 0.989  0.104
Age 41.076 23.756 42.003 23.678 34.537  19.546
Central City  0.627 0.484 0.624 0.484 0.602  0.489
Observations  67180  49999  15681   
 
  29Table 2: Full Sample Regression Results 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
       
superbowl  0.016  0.002 0.018 0.004 
  (0.469)  (0.933) (0.401) (0.899) 
sbplus1 -0.011  -0.012  0.004  -0.009 
  (0.647)  (0.730) (0.876) (0.801) 
sbminus1 -0.012  -0.036  0.009  -0.010 
  (0.696)  (0.536) (0.675) (0.848) 
presumoly -0.078*  -0.060  -0.087**  -0.056 
  (0.055)  (0.266) (0.019) (0.271) 
postsumoly -0.111***  0.003  -0.024  0.091** 
  (0.001)  (0.931) (0.403) (0.011) 
prewintoly -0.000  -0.093***  -0.013  -0.106** 
  (0.995)  (0.008) (0.794) (0.029) 
postwintoly 0.067  -0.006  0.055  -0.018 
  (0.141)  (0.887) (0.365) (0.768) 
prewc 0.119***  0.141***  0.024  0.046 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.348) (0.193) 
postwc 0.105***  0.076***  0.022  -0.008 
  (0.000)  (0.003) (0.333) (0.767) 
sbcencity    0.020  0.021 
   (0.553)    (0.535) 
sbpcencity    0.002  0.023 
   (0.960)    (0.635) 
sbmcencity    0.039  0.033 
   (0.617)    (0.681) 
presumcent   -0.088*    -0.108** 
   (0.071)    (0.022) 
prewincent    0.237***  0.237*** 
   (0.000)    (0.000) 
postsumcent   -0.259***    -0.259*** 
   (0.000)    (0.000) 
postwintcent    0.186***  0.186*** 
   (0.000)    (0.000) 
prewccencity   -0.031    -0.030 
   (0.405)    (0.417) 
postwccencity    0.044  0.044 
   (0.181)    (0.172) 
Observations  67180  67180 67180 67180 
R-squared  0.988  0.988 0.988 0.988 
All models include city specific dummy variables and city specific time trends. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust p values in parentheses 
  30Table 3: Big League Cities Regression Results 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
       
superbowl  0.017  0.001 0.018 0.001 
  (0.436)  (0.964) (0.403) (0.961) 
sbplus1 -0.011  -0.014  0.005  -0.010 
  (0.639)  (0.702) (0.856) (0.761) 
sbminus1 -0.013  -0.038  0.010  -0.010 
  (0.670)  (0.507) (0.661) (0.845) 
presumoly -0.079**  -0.062  -0.082**  -0.050 
  (0.049)  (0.253) (0.033) (0.342) 
postsumoly -0.107***  0.004  -0.016  0.098*** 
  (0.001)  (0.909) (0.621) (0.010) 
prewintoly -0.003  -0.098***  -0.017  -0.112** 
  (0.929)  (0.007) (0.724) (0.024) 
postwintoly 0.067  -0.007  0.047  -0.027 
  (0.145)  (0.870) (0.451) (0.665) 
prewc 0.122***  0.148***  0.021  0.046 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.485) (0.237) 
postwc 0.112***  0.087***  0.030  0.005 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.226) (0.857) 
sbcencity    0.024  0.024 
   (0.501)    (0.480) 
sbpcencity    0.005  0.027 
   (0.925)    (0.578) 
sbmcencity    0.042  0.034 
   (0.595)    (0.669) 
presumcent   -0.087*    -0.109** 
   (0.082)    (0.025) 
prewincent    0.241***  0.241*** 
   (0.000)    (0.000) 
postsumcent   -0.256***    -0.256*** 
   (0.000)    (0.000) 
postwintcent    0.188***  0.188*** 
   (0.000)    (0.000) 
prewccencity   -0.037    -0.036 
   (0.328)    (0.337) 
postwccencity    0.036  0.037 
   (0.266)    (0.254) 
Observations  49999  49999 49999 49999 
R-squared  0.988  0.988 0.988 0.988 
Robust p values in parentheses 
All models include city specific dummy variables and city specific time trends. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  31Table 4: Super Bowl Host Cities Regression Results 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
VARIABLES  Model 9  Model 10  Model 11  Model 12 
       
superbowl 0.041  0.181***  0.024  0.110* 
  (0.398) (0.007)  (0.680) (0.099) 
sbplus1 0.122  0.301*  -0.142  -0.208 
  (0.334) (0.093)  (0.133) (0.219) 
sbminus1 0.031  0.143  -0.094*  -0.018 
  (0.618) (0.141)  (0.072) (0.835) 
sbcencity   -0.243***    -0.150** 
   (0.004)   (0.035) 
sbpcencity   -0.355**    0.130 
   (0.031)   (0.439) 
sbmcencity   -0.201   -0.122 
   (0.119)   (0.316) 
Observations 15681  15681  15681  15681 
R-squared  0.984 0.984  0.986 0.986 
Robust p values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
All models include city specific dummy variables and city specific time trends. 
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Table 5: Joint Hypothesis Tests       







Effects Year  Effects 
        
Null: Coefficients equal 
zero Full  Sample 
All Events  Reject  Reject  Reject  Reject 
        
Super Bowl Only  Not Reject  Not Reject  Not Reject  Not Reject 
        
Olympics Only  Reject  Reject (5%)  Reject  Reject  
        
World Cup Only  Reject  Not Reject  Reject  Not Reject 
        
Interactions Only      Reject  Reject 
        
 Big  League  Cities 
All Events  Reject  Reject  Reject  Reject 
        
Super Bowl Only  Not Reject  Not Reject  Not Reject  Not Reject 
        
Olympics Only  Reject  Reject (5%)  Reject  Reject  
        
World Cup Only  Reject  Not Reject  Reject  Not Reject 
        
Interactions Only      Reject  Reject 
        
  Super Bowl Hosts 
All Events      Reject (5%) 
Reject 
(10%) 
        
Super Bowl Only  Not Reject  Not Reject  Reject (5%)  Not Reject 
        
Interactions Only      Reject  Reject (5%) 
Rejections  at the 1% level if not otherwise noted. 
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Table A1: Sample SMSAs       
Akron Colorado  Springs  Houston
NS Montgomery San  Antonio
N





N Jackson Nassau  San  Francisco
N
Allentown Corpus  Christi  Jacksonville
NS New Haven  San Jose
NW
Alton Dallas
NW Jersey City  New Orleans
NS Santa Barbara 
Anaheim
N Davenport  Johnson City  New York
NW Santa Rosa 





N Knoxville Norfolk  Scranton 








Aurora Duluth  Lancaster Omaha  Spokane 
Austin  East St Louis  Lansing  Orlando
NW Springfield 
Bakersfield  El Paso  Las Vegas  Oxnard  Stamford 
Baltimore
N Erie Lawrence  Pensacola  Stockton 
Batonrouge Eugene  Lexington  Peoria  Syracuse 
Beaumont Evansville  Little  Rock  Philadelphia
N Tacoma 





Passaic Ft  Lauderdale  Madison  Pittsburgh
N Toledo 
Birmingham Ft  Myers  McAllen  Providence  Trenton 
Boston
NW Ft Wayne  Melbourne  Raleigh
N Tucson 
Boulder Ft  Worth
W Memphis
N Riverside Tulsa 
Bridgeport Fresno  Miami
NS Rochester Utica 
Canton Gary  Middlesex  Rockford Vallejo 













N Modesto Salinas  Wichita 
Cleveland
N Honolulu  Monmouth  Salt Lake City
O Worcester 
      Youngstown 
 
N denotes Big League city 
S denotes Super Bowl host 
W denotes World Cup host 
O denotes Olympic host 
  34Table A2: Full Sample Housing Characteristics Regression Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
      
airsys  0.223*** 0.223*** 0.223*** 0.223*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
baths  0.203*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 0.203*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
bedrms  0.056*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
cencity  -0.088*** -0.090*** -0.088*** -0.090*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
detone  0.061*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
garage  0.143*** 0.144*** 0.143*** 0.144*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
halfb  0.075*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
holes  -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.115*** -0.114*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
highrise  -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.074*** -0.074*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lowrise  -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
  (0.690) (0.687) (0.705) (0.701) 
pubsew  0.064*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
unitage  -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
unitagesq  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations  67180 67180 67180 67180 
R-squared  0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 
Robust p values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes to Table 2 in the text apply. 
  35Table A5: Big League Cities Housing Characteristics Regression Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  Model 8 
      
airsys  0.220*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
baths  0.222*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
bedrms  0.046*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
cencity  -0.092*** -0.093*** -0.092*** -0.093*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
detone  0.042*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
garage  0.153*** 0.154*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
halfb  0.082*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
holes  -0.134*** -0.133*** -0.136*** -0.135*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
highrise  -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.068*** -0.068*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lowrise  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.851) (0.849) (0.852) (0.848) 
pubsew  0.079*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.081*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
unitage  -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
unitagesq  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations  49999 49999 49999 49999 
R-squared  0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 
Notes to Table 3 in the text apply. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Robust p values in parentheses 
  36Table A7: Super Bowl Host Cities Housing Characteristics Regression Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES  Model 9  Model 10  Model 11  Model 12 
      
cencity  0.018 0.082*** 0.001  0.019 
  (0.321) (0.004) (0.954) (0.513) 
airsys  0.330*** 0.330*** 0.310*** 0.308*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
baths  0.454*** 0.446*** 0.390*** 0.390*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
bedrms  0.121*** 0.122*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
detone -0.093***  -0.091***  -0.069**  -0.068** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.020) (0.022) 
garage  0.241*** 0.246*** 0.220*** 0.219*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
halfb  0.134*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
holes -0.166*  -0.166*  -0.167**  -0.170** 
  (0.056) (0.055) (0.046) (0.042) 
highrise  0.475*** 0.461*** 0.398*** 0.396*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
lowrise  0.434*** 0.425*** 0.346*** 0.346*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
pubsew  3.800*** 3.762*** 2.902*** 2.893*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
unitage  0.021*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) 
unitagesq  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.008) 
Observations  15681 15681 15681 15681 
R-squared  0.984 0.984 0.986 0.986 
Robust p values in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes to Table 4 in the text apply. 
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